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The Illinois Adoption Act: Should a Child's Length
of Time in Foster Care Measure Parental Unfitness?
"[U]nless we are concerned about justice for the parent, we may be
unlikely to achieve justice for the child."'
I. INTRODUCTION
When Angie Yarwood was twelve years old, state social workers
placed her in a foster home because they were convinced that her
mother had beaten her.2 Although Angie's parents adamantly denied
these charges, Judge Borst made Angie a temporary "dependent" of
the state and ordered Angie's parents to participate in psychological
and substance abuse evaluations, parenting classes, and, most
importantly, intensive counseling for domestic violence.3 Initially,
Angie's parents were not receptive to counseling.4 Nine months after
sending Angie to foster care, social workers concluded that any further
therapy for her parents was futile.5 The social workers subsequently
terminated state-funded counseling services and informed Angie's
foster parents that they would likely become Angie's guardians.6
Four months after the social workers terminated counseling, Judge
Borst told Angie's parents to return to counseling; failure to do so
would result in them losing Angie for good.' One month later,
Angie's parents did return to counseling.8 At this point, the state
assigned them to a new therapist who had extensive experience with
"tough" families. 9 Angie's parents made progress with their new
therapist over the following months.' ° As a result, the therapist
1. Alfred Kadushin, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: An Essay Review, 48
Soc. SERV. REv. 508, 514 (1974).
2. See Heath Foster, A Child Welfare Odyssey: 12-Year-Old Angie Suffered Bruises
and the State Stepped In-After That, Nothing Was Simple, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
June 17, 1998, at Al.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Heath Foster, Parents Confront Troubled Past Counseling and Cooperation
Precede Decision on Angie's Future, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 18, 1998, at Al.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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eventually recommended that the state return Angie to her parents. "
Judge Borst allowed Angie to return home to her family twenty-five
months after removal, as long as her parents continued counseling.
2
This story illustrates that some parents are able to regain custody of
their children from foster care if given enough time to correct the
problems that prompted the intervention of the child welfare system.
In June of 1998, however, the Illinois Legislature added a new
parental unfitness ground to the Illinois Adoption Act ("Adoption
Act"). 13  Under this new criterion, the court would have had to
consider Angie's parents "unfit" for the purpose of terminating their
parental rights once Angie had been in foster care for fifteen months. 4
This new unfitness ground was part of a large legislative package,
which the Illinois General Assembly enacted in order to comply with
the provisions of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
("ASFA")."' ASFA emphasizes the termination of parental rights and
adoptions as the primary means of moving children out of foster care
more quickly. 16 By creating this new unfitness ground, however,
Illinois places unnecessary emphasis on the termination of parental
rights-more emphasis than required by the federal government.17
This Comment will begin by briefly examining the history of the
Adoption Act from its inception. 8 Specifically, this article will focus
on the evolution of the grounds for terminating the parental rights of
"unfit" parents. 19 The Comment will then examine the provisions of
11. See id.
12. See id. The judge allowed her return in spite of the fact that the social workers be-
lieved Angie would be "better off' with her foster parents. See id. The therapist noted
that the relevant question was not who would make the best parents for Angie but
whether Angie's own parents had made enough progress to ensure Angie's safety. See
id.
13. The Adoption Act provides a new ground for ascertaining parental unfitness,
measuring parental unfitness by the length of time a child has been in foster care and
rendering a parent unfit if a child has been in foster care for "15 out of 22 months." See
Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, sec. 40, § 50/1(D)(m-1), 1998 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 1575, 1627 (West) (to be codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/1(D)(m-1)); see
also infra Part III.B (discussing the newly enacted "15 out of 22 month" parental
unfitness provision).
14. In fact, Angie had been in foster care for 25 months-10 months longer than this
new criterion. See Foster, supra note 5, at Al.
15. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
16. See id.
17. See id. ASFA contains no provisions regarding parental unfitness grounds. See
id.
18. See infra Part H.A.1.
19. See infra Part H.A.1-3.
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ASFA 20 and discuss how its philosophy regarding achieving
permanency for children in foster care differs from its predecessor, the
federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
("AACWA"). 21 Next, the Comment will briefly explore the under-
lying and predominant theoretical basis that legislators, lawyers, and
social workers have used to approach child welfare for the past thirty
years and will then present criticisms of this theoretical basis.22 This
Comment will then discuss Illinois' response to ASFA and explain
how the enactment of the new "fifteen out of twenty-two months"
ground for parental unfitness transcends the mandated provisions in
ASFA. 23 This Comment will argue that this new unfitness ground will
fail to achieve permanency for Illinois' foster children.24
Further, this Comment will contend that the new unfitness ground
disregards the importance of a child's biological parents and families
and fails to protect the rights of biological parents in the context of
termination proceedings. 25 The Comment then proposes that the
Illinois General Assembly repeal the "fifteen out of twenty-two month"
unfitness ground and argues that the need for improved social work
practice and services for families before parental unfitness can be
measured with accuracy and care.2 6 Further, these suggested improve-
ments will allow Illinois to utilize the already existing parental
unfitness grounds more effectively, giving Illinois sufficient means to
terminate rights when parents truly are not capable of caring for their
children.27
II. BACKGROUND
Illinois legislation concerning the termination of parental rights and
the adoption of children has changed significantly since its inception.28
Illinois' first adoption statute contained only two paragraphs and did
not address parental unfitness standards.29 Over time, however, the
20. See infra Part II.B.
2 1. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (amended 1997); see
also infra Part II.B.1 (highlighting the provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act).
22. See infra Part II.B.3.
23. See infra Part HI.
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. See infra Part IV.B-C.
26. See infra Part V.A.
27. See infra Part V.
28. See infra Part II.A.1-3.
29. See Act of Feb. 22, 1867, 1867 Ill. Laws 133, 133-34 (repealed 1874).
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Illinois General Assembly has given increased attention to children and
their adoption by creating and periodically expanding the circum-
stances or "grounds" under which Illinois can terminate parental
rights. 3' As a result, the Illinois Adoption Act currently contains
nearly twenty-five parental unfitness grounds.3'
A. The History of the Illinois Adoption Statute
1. The Early History of Adoption in Illinois
The Illinois General Assembly addressed the adoption of children
for the first time in 1867 with the passage of a session law entitled "An
Act to Provide for the Adoption of Minors., 32 This session law set
forth simple requirements regarding adoption in two sections.33
Section one addressed the manner of an adoption proceeding itself.34
This section explained that any person could initiate an adoption
proceeding by filing a petition in the circuit or county court of his or
her residence.35 Section two discussed the rights of the child's
guardian or relative within the context of the adoption proceeding.36
Specifically, this section allowed the guardian or relative of the child to
file an objection to the proposed adoption.37
The Adoption Act has evolved quite slowly. 38 Illinois law relating
to the adoption of children remained relatively unaltered 39 until 1874
when the Illinois General Assembly revised the 1867 session law and
also added six new sections.40 The 1874 revisions addressed several
30. See infra Part II.A.2-3.
3 1. See Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, sec. 40, 1998 Ill. Legis. Serv.
1575, 1625-28 (West) (to be codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/1).
32. Act of Feb. 22, 1867. It should be noted that throughout this article the terms
"session law" and "act" will be used interchangeably.
33. See id. §§ 1-2.
34. See id. § 1.
35. See id. The first section of the 1867 session law required the following two
factors to be met in order for such an adoption petition to be granted: (1) proof that
either the child's father, mother, or guardian had consented to the adoption; and (2)
proof that the adoption would be "to the interest of the child." Id.
36. See id. § 2.
37. See id. If the court found "good reason" for the guardian or relative's objection,
then the 1867 session law then required the court to reject the adoption petition. See id.
38. See infra Part II.A.2 (noting that after 1907, the Illinois General Assembly did
not significantly alter the Illinois Adoption Act until 1945).
39. However, in 1873, the Illinois General Assembly made minor changes to the first
section of the 1867 Act. See Act of Apr. 25, 1873, 1873 Ill. Laws 126 (repealed 1945).
(providing more detail regarding the property rights of adopted children than initially
contained in the 1867 Act).
40. See Act of Feb. 27, 1874, ch. 4, 1874 ILL. REv. STAT. 128 (repealed 1945). It
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new issues regarding the adoption of children, including the necessary
findings for entering an adoption decree. 4' These findings included:
(1) natural parents deserting the child for a period of one year
preceding the adoption petition to the court; (2) if neither parent was
living, the child's guardian or next of kin's consent to the adoption; or
(3) proof that the child had no living parents, guardian, or next of kin
capable of giving consent.42 Additionally, the person applying for the
adoption had to be able to nurture the child and provide the child with a
proper education.43 The 1874 revisions also addressed the legal effect
of the adoption in regard to the child's natural parents' and the child's
wishes regarding the adoption.45
Reflecting the Illinois General Assembly's increased concern for an
adopted child's well-being, the Illinois General Assembly changed the
Adoption Act significantly in 1907.46 The 1907 amendments added
parental unfitness grounds to the requisite findings for entering an
adoption decree.47 The 1907 amendments entitled a court to deem a
parent unfit if it found one of the following criteria:
(1) depravity; (2) open and notorious adultery or fornication;
(3) habitual drunkenness for the space of one year prior to the
filing of the petition; (4) extreme and repeated cruelty to the
child; (5) abandonment of the child; or (6) desertion of the
should be noted that the Illinois General Assembly repealed the 1867 Act, along with
almost all other Illinois legislation enacted prior to 1870, with the passage of the
"Repeals Act" on March 31, 1874 in force July 1, 1874. See Repeals Act, 3 ILL. STAT.
332-56 (Gross 1874).
41. See Act of Feb. 27, 1874 § 3.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. § 8 (stating that an adoption deprived the child's natural parents of all
legal rights with respect to the child).
45. See id. § 4 (providing that consent of the child was needed in any adoption
proceeding involving a child fourteen years of age or older).
46. See Act of May 25, 1907, 1907 I11. Laws 3 (repealed 1945). Presently, under
Illinois law, a finding of parental unfitness is only the first step in terminating parental
rights. See In re Adoption of Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174, 183 (Il1. 1990). In addition to a
finding of parental unfitness, a court must also conclude that the termination of parental
rights is in the child's "best interest." See id. Moreover, parental unfitness must be
proven by "clear and convincing" evidence rather than by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US 745, 769 (1982). However, in cases
involving the termination of Indian parental rights, Congress requires "evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt" reasoning that "the removal of a child from the parents is a penalty
as great [as], if not greater, than a criminal penalty." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-1386,
at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7545).
47. See Act of May 25, 1907 § 3. While adding parental unfitness as one of the
requisite findings for entering an adoption decree, the 1907 amendments retained
consent to the adoption by either of the child's living parents, guardian, or near relative
as a possible ground for entering the adoption decree. See id.
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child for more than six (6) months preceding the filing of the
adoption petition.48
In addition to the new parental unfitness grounds, the 1907
amendments authorized adoptions in cases where a court had
previously deprived the natural parent of his or her custody of the
child.4 9 In these cases, however, the court also required the consent of
the child's court appointed guardian before authorizing an adoption.5 °
2. The Enactment of the Illinois Adoption Act of 1945 and its
Subsequent Evolution
The Illinois General Assembly did not make significant changes to
Illinois' Adoption Act again until 1945. 5' Specifically, the Illinois
General Assembly repealed the Act of 1874 and enacted the Adoption
Act of 1945 ("Act of 1945"). 52 The Act of 1945 was Illinois' first
comprehensive statute regarding the adoption of children. 3 The Act of
1945 contained several substantive changes to the provisions guiding
the adoption of children.54 First, the Act of 1945 mandated that before
the state could grant an adoption petition, the state needed proof that
the child had resided with the prospective adoptive parents for at least
six consecutive months preceding the filing of the adoption petition.55
In addition, the Act of 1945 required the state to investigate the
48. Id. In 1997, the Illinois General Assembly added a similar "desertion" provision
relating more specifically to the abandonment of newborns in the hospital. See infra
note 95 and accompanying text (noting the addition of the desertion of a newborn to
Illinois' parental unfitness criterion).
49. See Act of May 25, 1907 § 3 (making it less difficult for courts to authorize
adoptions).
50. See id.
51. See Adoption Act of 1945, 1945 Ill. Laws 9 (repealed 1959). The Illinois General
Assembly, however, made minor changes to Illinois' Adoption Act prior to 1945 with
the passage of session laws in 1933, 1935 and 1939. See Act of July 6, 1933, 1933 Ill.
Laws 8 (repealed 1959) (adding more detail to the content of an adoption petition,
defining illegitimate child, and making minor changes with respect to the grounds for
granting an adoption petition); Act of June 27, 1935, 1935 Ill. Laws 5 (repealed 1959)
(adding additional requirements to the contents of the adoption petition); Act of March
22, 1939, 1939 Ill. Laws 12 (repealed 1959) (repealing sections five through seven of
the 1874 Act relating to the inheritance and property rights of adopted children and
adopting parents).
52. See Adoption Act of 1945 § 9-1.
53. See generally JOAN GITTENS, POOR RELATIONS-THE CHILD OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
1818-1990, at 246-47 n.2 (1994) (noting that Illinois did not have an effective
adoption statute until 1945).
54. See Adoption Act of 1945 § 1-9.
55. See id. § 1-2(4). Further, if the child had not resided in the prospective adoptive
home for the required time period, then the Act of 1945 required the prospective adoptive
parents to detail the reasons for the failure. See id.
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character, reputation, and religious faith56 of the prospective adoptive
parents.57 Finally, the Act of 1945 required the state to inquire
whether the prospective parent was the appropriate person to adopt the
child and whether the child was appropriate for adoption.58
In addition to the revisions regarding prospective adoptive parents,
the Act of 1945 also added a new provision that authorized
adoptions. 59 Specifically, the court could enter an adoption decree if it
found that the natural parents had surrendered the child to a licensed
child welfare agency for adoption. 6' Further, the Act of 1945 also
contained the following notable revisions: (1) a provision stating that
whenever possible, the court must give custody to petitioners who had
the same religious affiliation as the child;61 (2) a provision precluding
the inspection of the records of the adoption proceedings unless a
specific court order granted otherwise;6' and (3) a provision giving any
"aggrieved" person the right to appeal the adoption.63
Building on the substantial changes enacted in 1945, the Illinois
General Assembly added two new possible findings for granting an
adoption petition in 1953.64 First, a court could grant an adoption
56. See id. § 3-1. Whenever possible, the Illinois General Assembly sought to place
a child with parents who held the same religious faith as the child. See also id. § 4-2;
infra note 61 and accompanying text (noting Illinois' continuing emphasis on the
religious faith of the adopting parent in an adoption decision).
57. See Adoption Act of 1945 § 3-1. These requirements mark a sharp contrast to the
original 1867 Act that placed no restrictions whatsoever on who could adopt a child and
simply required the adoption to be "in the interest of the child." Act of Feb. 22, 1867,
1867 111. Laws 133 (repealed 1874); supra note 35 (noting that the first section of the
1867 law created this requirement).
58. See Adoption Act of 1945 § 3-1 (reflecting further the Illinois General
Assembly's growing consciousness regarding an adoptive child's well-being by
ensuring a good match between prospective parent and child).
59. See id. § 4-1(4).
60. See id. In addition, the Act of 1945 required the consent of the child welfare
agency. See id. It should also be noted that this provision supported a natural parent's
decision to voluntarily "surrender" his or her child for adoption when that parent felt
that he or she could not care for the child. See id.
61. See id. § 4-2.
62. See id. § 6-2. For a discussion of the benefits of open and cooperative adoption
procedures see Annette Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative
Adoption: Can it Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L. Q. 483, 516 (1996).
63. See Adoption Act of 1945 § 7-2. While not delineated by the Illinois General
Assembly in 1945, "aggrieved" persons in an adoption proceeding would most likely
include the adopted child's natural parents or a member of the adopted child's natural
family.
64. See Act of July 13, 1953, § 4-1(4L)(a)-(b), 1953 I11. Laws 1061, 1062-63
(repealed 1959). The Illinois General Assembly continued to focus on the adopted
child's well-being by recognizing that both minor parents and mentally ill parents may
be incapable of caring for their children. See id.
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petition if it found that a child's natural parents were minors, that they
wanted the child to be adopted, and that they had expressed such
desire in writing.65 Second, a court could grant an adoption petition
when the court found that the child's natural parents were mentally ill
for a three year period prior to the adoption proceeding.66 The 1953
Act required that two qualified physicians corroborate the parent's
mental illness.67
3. The Adoption Act of 1959 Until the Present
In 1959, the Illinois General Assembly again turned its attention to
the adoption of children when it repealed the Act of 1945 in its entirety
and enacted the Adoption Act of 1959 ("Act of 1959") in its place.68
The two acts significantly differed on the determination of parental
unfitness. 69  Specifically, the Act of 1959 placed the grounds for
parental unfitness in a new definition section rather than in the Act of
1945's section addressing the grounds or findings necessary to grant
70
an adoption. Moreover, the Act of 1959 added a new parental
unfitness ground that rendered a parent unfit if the parent had neglected
or mistreated the child.7'
After passing the Act of 1959, the Illinois General Assembly added
65. See id. § 4-1(4 1)(a). In addition, the 1953 amendments also required the
appointment of a guardian ad litem on behalf of the minor parents, and the guardian ad
litem's consent to the adoption. See id. A guardian ad litem is:
a special guardian appointed by the court in which a particular litigation is
pending to represent an infant, ward or unborn person in that particular
litigation, and the status of guardian ad litem exists only in that specific
litigation in which the appointment occurs.
Black's Law Dictionary 706 (6th ed. 1990).
66. See Act of July 13, 1953 § 4-1(4 1-)(b). Like cases involving minor parents, the
2.1953 amendments also required the appointment of a guardian ad litem on behalf of the
mentally ill parents and the consent of such guardian ad litem to the adoption. See also
supra note 65 and accompanying text (defining guardian ad litem).
67. See Act of July 13, 1953 § 4-1(4 1 )(b). In order to use this ground for adoption,
the 1953 Act also required a finding that the parent had no hope of recovering from the
mental illness in the forseeable future. See id.
68. See Adoption Act of 1959, 1959 I11. Laws 1269 (repealed 1967).
69. See id. § I(D). However, the Act of 1959 resembled the Act of 1945 in that it
contained the six grounds for determining parental unfitness initially enacted in 1907.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text (listing the six grounds that were enacted to
determine parental unfitness).
70. See Adoption Act of 1959 § I(D). In addition, to "unfit person," the 1959 Act
also defined child, related child, parent, agency, mentally ill, and mentally deficient for
purposes of an adoption proceeding. See id. § 1 (A)-(C), (E)-(G); see also supra notes
51-63 and accompanying text (highlighting various provisions of the 1945 Adoption
Act).
7 1. See Adoption Act of 1959 § l(D)(g).
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three new grounds for finding parental unfitness in 1967.72 These
three new grounds focused on the parent's relationship with the child
and addressed the following issues: (1) the extent that the child's
natural parent demonstrated concern for the child's welfare; 73 (2) the
parent's continuous or repeated neglect of the child;74 and (3) the
parent's failure to protect the child from harmful conditions within the
child's environment. 75 The Illinois General Assembly also revised the
pre-existing ground of neglect or misconduct.76 The revised statute no
longer required a court to adhere to previous findings, decrees, orders,
and judgments from other proceedings affecting or determining
parental rights.77 The revised statute, however, still bound courts to
follow decrees that the state had procured in termination proceedings
under the Adoption Act or the Juvenile Court Act.
78
The Illinois General Assembly further amended the 1959 Act in
1973 by including a ground for unfitness 79 if a parent failed to make
reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that prompted the removal
72. See Act of July 31, 1967 § I(D)(b), (d), (f), 1967 111. Laws 2273, 2274.
73. See id. § (D)(b). See generally Diane Geraghty, Ending Family Ties:
Termination of Parental Rights in Illinois, 79 ILL. B. J. 572, 573 (1991) (discussing the
judicial treatment of this ground). Geraghty discusses the difficulty of proving parental
unfitness under this ground. See id. In 1973, the Illinois General Assembly placed a
special emphasis on a lack of concern for newborns by adding a ground that rendered a
parent unfit if he or she failed to show a reasonable interest in the newborn thirty
consecutive days after birth. See Act of Sept. 14, 1973, Pub. L. No. 78-854, § l(D)(k),
1973 Ill. Laws 2616, 2617.
74. See Act of July 31, 1967 § l(D)(d).
75. See id. § l(D)(f). See generally Geraghty, supra note 73, at 573 (explaining that
this grounds will support a finding of unfitness even where the parent did not personally
inflict the harm).
76. See Act of July 31, 1967 § l(D)(g); see also supra notes 73-74 and accompanying
text (establishing that, as of 1959, a parent could be declared unfit for neglecting or
mistreating his or her child).
77. See Act of July 31, 1967 § l(D)(g).
78. See id. § l(D)(g); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2, 2-13 to -29 (West 1993). While
not containing any definitions of parental unfitness, the Juvenile Court Act contains
various provisions relating to the termination of parental rights. See 705 ILL COMP.
STAT. 405/2-13 to -29. The state typically files an adoption petition under the Juvenile
Court Act in cases where the Juvenile Court has entered a finding of abuse, neglect or
dependency with respect to that child. See Geraghty, supra note 73, at 574-75.
However, even if a petition for an involuntary adoption originates under the Juvenile
Court Act, a finding of unfitness as defined under the Adoption Act must still be found in
order to terminate parental rights. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 504/2-29(4). For an
overview of the procedural differences between the Adoption Act and Juvenile Court Act,
see Geraghty, supra note 73, at 574-75.
79. It should be noted that a 1973 amendment added a parental unfitness ground
relating to newborns. See Act of Sept. 14, 1973, Pub. L. No. 78-854, § l(D)(k), 1973
Ill. Laws 2612, 2617; see also supra note 73 (explaining the 1973 requirement that a
parent must show interest in the newborn thirty consecutive days after birth).
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of the child.8 ° The 1973 ground gave a parent twenty-four months8'
after an adjudication of neglect under section 2-4 of the Juvenile Court
Act to make such efforts.82
Concern for child safety and welfare prompted the Illinois General
Assembly to add significant new grounds for finding a parent unfit in
1977.83 Specifically, the 1977 amendment deemed a parent unfit
under the following circumstances: (1) if the court made two or more
previous findings of physical abuse to any child under section 4-8 of
the Juvenile Court Act;84 (2) if the court entered a criminal conviction
for the death of any child as a result of physical child abuse; or (3) a
finding of physical child abuse stemming from the death of any child
under section 4-8 of the Juvenile Court Act.85 Further, the 1977
amendment deemed a parent unfit if he or she failed to stay in contact
86
with the child or to make plans for the child's future.87 The Illinois
General Assembly also revised the habitual drunkenness ground to
include a parent's addiction to drugs.88
80. See Act of Sept. 14, 1973 § I(D)(I).
81. In 1977, The Illinois General Assembly shortened this time period to twelve
months. See Act of Sept. 8, 1977, Pub. L. No. 80-558, § l(D)(m), 1977 I11. Laws 1779,
1780.
82. See Act of Sept. 14, 1973 § I(D)(I). Entitled "Neglected minor," Section 2-4 of
the Juvenile Court Act stated that a neglected child included any minor under 18:
(a) who is neglected as to proper or necessary support, education as required by
law, or as to medical or other remedial care recognized under State law or other
care necessary for his well-being, or who is abandoned by his parents,
guardian or custodian; or (b) whose environment is injurious to his welfare or
whose behavior is injurious to his own welfare or that of others.
Juvenile Court Act of 1965, 37 ILL. REv. STAT. § 702-4 (1973) (repealed 1987).
83. See Act of Sept. 8, 1977 § l(D)(f),(n).
84. Entitled "Findings and Adjudication," Section 4-8 of the Juvenile Court Act
provided:
If the court finds under 2-4 of this Act that the minor is neglected or under
Section 2-5 of this Act that the minor is dependent the court shall then find
whether such neglect or dependency is the result of physical abuse to the
minor inflicted by a parent, guardian or legal custodian and such finding shall
appear in the order of the court.
Juvenile Court Act of 1965, 37 ILL. REv. STAT. § 704-8(2) (1977) (repealed 1987).
85. See Act of Sept. 8, 1977 §1 (D)(f). For the relevant text of Section 4-8 of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1965, see supra note 84.
86. The 1977 amendment deemed a parent unfit if the parent failed to stay in contact
with the child for a period of 12 months. See Act of Sept. 8, 1977 § l(D)(n). In
assessing a parent's contact, the 1977 amendment also required the courts to consider
steps taken by the child welfare agency to strengthen the child's relationship with the
parent. See id.
87. See id. However, this new ground stated that any communication or contact by a
parent with a child that lacked affection and concern did not constitute reasonable
contact. See id.
88. See id. § l(D)(k). This addition was quite significant given the prevalence of
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Illinois General Assembly
added several new grounds89 for determining parental unfitness,
including, but not limited to: (1) evidence of a parent's intent to forgo
his or her parental rights;9° (2) an inability to parent due to a mental
illness or mental impairment; 91 (3) a finding of physical abuse of the
child coupled with a criminal conviction of aggravated battery of the
child;92 (4) substantial and continuous neglect of any child residing in
the household that resulted in the death of the child;93 (5) a finding of
substance abuse in proceedings for child abuse and neglect. See infra Part IV.C
(explaining the effect of substance abuse on adoption proceedings).
89. This expansion of parental unfitness grounds has led to an increase in the number
of children who are legally "free" for adoption. See Letter from Christine B. Crum,
Director of Operations, Circuit Court of Cook County, Child Protection Division, to
author (Sept. 15, 1998) (on file with the author) (reflecting a steady increase in both the
number of termination petitions filed and parental rights terminated throughout the
1990's) [hereinafter Crum Letter]. Unfortunately, however, the number of adoptive
homes for children has not kept pace with this increase. See Talk of the Nation:
Adoptions for Abused and Neglected Children in Foster Care 10 (National Public Radio
broadcast, Nov. 18, 1997) (transcript available in 1997 WL 15382360) (stating that
Cook County terminated close to 7,000 parental rights in 1996 while only 1,500
adoptions occurred) [hereinafter Talk of the Nation]. As a result, these terminations
have created a cadre of "legal orphans"-children legally severed from their natural
parents without an awaiting adoptive home. See id. "I agree permanence should be the
goal but in some case[s] permanence will not be there, and I don't want to move too
many kids-it's [creating] legal orphans." Id.
90. See Act of Sept. 11, 1981, Pub. L. No. 82-437, § l(D)(n), 1982 Ill. Laws 2278,
2279. Intent to forgo parental rights could be demonstrated by a failure for twelve
months "(i) to visit the child, (ii) to communicate with the child or agency, although
able to do so and not prevented from doing so by an agency or by court order, or (iii) to
maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically able to do
so." Id. The Illinois General Assembly made further amendments to this ground in 1986
by adding a clause relating specifically to unmarried fathers. See Act of Sept. 24, 1986,
Pub. L. No. 84-1427, § l(D)(n)(2), 1986 Ill. Laws 3700, 3702. This clause stated that
an unmarried father demonstrated his intent to forgo his parental rights by a failure
(i) to commence legal proceedings to establish his paternity . . . within 30
days of being informed ... that he is the father ... of the child ... or (ii) to
make a good faith effort to pay a reasonable amount of the expenses related to
the birth of the child and to provide a reasonable amount for the financial
support of the child....
Id.
91. See Act of Sept. 26, 1983, Pub. L. No. 83-870, § l(D)(p), 1983 I11. Laws 5623,
5625. Under the 1983 session law, an inability to discharge parental responsibilities
had to be supported by "competent evidence from a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist
of mental impairment, mental illness[, or] mental retardation . . . and there [had to be] a
sufficient justification to believe that such inability to discharge parental
responsibilities . . . extend[ed] beyond a reasonable time period." Id. For a discussion
of judicial interpretation of this grounds, see Geraghty, supra note 73, at 573-74.
92. See Act of Aug. 30, 1989, Pub. L. No. 86-403, sec. 2, § l(D)(q), 1989 I11. Laws,
2520, 2522-23.
93. See Act of Jan. 28, 1996, Pub. L. No. 89-0704, § l(D)(d-1), 1996 Ill. Laws 3963,
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drugs at birth in the child's urine when the biological mother of such
child had at least one other child adjudicated neglected; 94 or (6)
abandonment of the newborn in a hospital or any setting that suggested
the parent wanted to relinquish his or her parental rights.95
B. Federal Statute: Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
1. Prior Legislation and Motivation for the Act
On November 18, 1997, President Clinton signed into law the most
extensive federal child welfare legislation in nearly two decades: the
Adoption and Safe Families Act ("ASFA").96 The ASFA significantly
changed and clarified a wide range of policies that the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act ("AACWA") had established.7
The AACWA introduced the landmark concept of "permanency
planning ' 98 to federal child welfare legislation.99 The AACWA
intended for permanency planning to curb the problem of "foster care
3970.
94. See Act of June 23, 1997, Pub. L. No. 90-13, sec. 5, § l(D)(r), 1997 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 1193, 1195 (West).
95. See Act of June 25, 1997, Pub. L. No. 90-28, sec. 10-25, § 1(D)(2-1),(2-2), 1997
I11. Legis. Serv. 1792, 1857 (West 1997).
96. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.); see also Bill Grimm, Adoption
and Safe Families Act Brings Big Changes in Child Welfare, 28 YOUTH L. NEWS, 1, 1
(1997) (noting that ASFA will affect "everybody" and marks the most substantial
change in federal child welfare policy since the enactment of AACWA in 1980). See
generally Lisa Carpenter, Note, Changing the Balance: Rhode Island's Amended
Termination of Parental Rights Statute, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 153, 156-
63 (1996) (describing a broader historical overview of the federal government's
treatment of child welfare and child custody).
97. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.) (amended 1997).
Congress enacted the AACWA in 1980 to assist the states in protecting and caring for
abused and neglected children. See Jennifer Ayres Hand, Preventing Undue
Terminations: A Critical Evaluation of the Length-Of-Time-Out-Of-Custody Ground for
Termination of Parental Rights, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1251, 1258 (1996).
98. One working definition of permanency planning is "the systematic process of
carrying out, within a brief time-limited period, a set of goal-directed activities designed
to help children live in families that offer continuity of relationships with nurturing
parents or caretakers and the opportunity to establish life-time relationships." David J.
Herring, Exploring the Political Roles of the Family: Justifications for Permanency
Planning for Children, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L. J. 183, 185 n.6 (1995) (quoting Anthony N.
Maluccio & Edith Fein, Permanency Planning: A Redefinition, 62 CHILD WELFARE 195,
197 (1983)).
99. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West 1991) (amended by ASFA in 1997). However,
some states such as New York, California, and South Carolina began implementing the
idea of permanency planning into their child welfare policies as early as the 1970's. See
Ayres Hand, supra note 97, at 1258 n.44.
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drift"-children "stuck" in the foster care system for extended periods
of time while bouncing from foster home to foster home with little or
no contact with their biological families.1 0 In order to qualify for
federal funding, the AACWA required states to make "reasonable
efforts" to prevent the removal of a child from the home.' Similarly,
the AAWCA required states to make reasonable efforts to reunify the
family if the state removed the child.0 2 Further, the AACWA
mandated that state child welfare agencies develop a case plan 10 3 for
each child under its care.'l ' The AACWA also demanded that courts
and administrative agencies review cases every six months and
conduct dispositional hearings for the child after eighteen months.'0 5
Despite the AACWA's asserted goals of moving children out of
foster care and into stable placements more swiftly, 1 6 both legislators
and child welfare agencies became increasingly dissatisfied with the
functioning of the child welfare system throughout the 1990s.' °7 The
100. See Ayres Hand, supra note 97, at 1256. In 1959, Henry S. Maas and Richard E.
Engler Jr. initially introduced the notion of "Foster Care Drift" in their seminal work,
Children in Need of Parents. See id. at 1256 n.28 (citing HENRY S. MAAS & RICHARD E.
ENGLER JR., CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS, 1 (1959)).
101. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15).
102. See id. For a comprehensive examination of the 1980 "reasonable efforts"
standard, see Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect
Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REv. 223 (1989-1990).
103. The 1980 federal legislation defined "case plan" as a written document that
includes, among other things, a discussion of the appropriateness of the "type of home
or institution in which a child is to be placed." 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(l)(A).
104. See id. § 675(5)(B), (C).
105. See id. The AAWCA required courts to address the child's permanency plan at
the dispositional hearing. See id.
106. According to the drafter of the AACWA, the Act attempted to "lessen the
emphasis on foster care placement and to encourage greater efforts to find permanent
homes for children either by making it possible for them to return to their own families
or by placing them in adoptive homes." S. REP. No. 96-336, at 1 (1979), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1450.
107. During the congressional hearings on ASFA, David S. Liedermann, Executive
Director of the Child Welfare League of America testified that:
[diespite improvements and progress, the nation's collective response to
abused, neglected and abandoned children is failing to provide both protection
and permanence for many children. There are many reasons for this, not the
least of which is the tripling in the number of children reported abused and
neglected since 1980, the failure of state, Federal and local targeted resources
to keep pace with this rise.
Encouraging Adoption, 1997: Hearings on H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources of the Ways and Means Comm., 105th Cong. 36 (1997) (statement of David
S. Liedermann, Executive Director of the Child Welfare League of America) [hereinafter
Encouraging Adoption, statement of David S. Liedermann]; see also Gail Vida Hamburg,
Childhood Spent Waiting Through No Fault of Their Own Foster Children Just Need a
Home Series: When Parents Fail, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 1998, § 13, at I. (noting that the
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child welfare system was not achieving safety or permanence for
children." 8 This dissatisfaction arose as a result of several factors,
such as the record-high number of children in the foster care system
nationwide,1 °9 the increasing length of time children remained in the
foster care system,11° and the perception that states were reunifying
children with their biological families without a concern for their safety
as a result of the reasonable efforts requirement.111 These factors
foster care system as part of the larger child-welfare system is in crisis).
108. See Encouraging Adoption, statement of David A. Liedermann, supra note 107,
at 36.
109. See Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility Reviews and Child and Family Services
State Plan Reviews, 63 Fed. Reg. 50,058 (1998) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.1355-
56) (proposed Sept. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility Reviews]
(listing the doubling of the number of children in foster care since the 1980's as a
primary source of the dissatisfaction with the performance of the child welfare system);
H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 7-8 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740
(noting that after many years of growth in the 1980s and 1990s, the nation's foster care
caseload has peaked at 500,000). Upset over the burgeoning numbers of children in
foster care was also evident during the debates of AFSA, with one Congressman stating
"[flive hundred thousand. That is right, one-half of one million. That is how many
children are languishing in foster care as we debate this bill today. The major goal of
Federal and State policy ... is to move these children to permanent placements as
quickly as possible." 143 CONG. REC. H2012, H2015 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997)
(statement of Rep. Shaw); see also Dana Mack, We Can't Help Kids By Destroying
Families, L.A.TIMES, Dec. 1, 1997, at B5 (noting that the "[g]rowing concern for the
more than 500,000 American children in foster care prompted Congress to pass
legislation intended to expedite adoptions"). Illinois, along with the rest of the nation
has also experienced unprecedented growth in the number of children under the care and
custody of the foster care system. See Adoption Promotion Act of 1997: Hearings on
H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 105th Cong. 36 (1997) (statement of Jess McDonald, Director of Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services) [hereinafter Adoption Hearings, statement
of Jess McDonald]. Specifically, Jess McDonald informed Congress that between June
1986 and June of 1995, the size of the substitute care population in Illinois expanded at
an average annual rate of 15 % from 13,734 to 47,862. See id.
1 10. The House Report on ASFA noted that "[r]ecent studies have shown that in some
States, the average child removed from the home because of family problems spends
almost three years in foster care." H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 8, reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2740. Additionally, during his testimony before the House Ways and
Means Subcommittee, United States Senator Mike DeWine emphasized that children are
spending too much time in foster care and noted that ASFA takes "important steps such
as limiting the amount of time that the youngest children spend in foster care." See
Adoption Promotion Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. On Human
Resources of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 10 (1997) (statement
of Sen. DeWine) [hereinafter Adoption Hearings, statement of Sen. Mike DeWine]; see
also 143 CONG. REC. H2012, H2018 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Burton) (emphasizing that children wait an average of two and a half years for courts to
terminate parental rights); Hamburg, supra note 107, at 2 (stating that prior to ASFA,
children averaged three and one half to five and one half years in foster care).
1 11. See 143 CONG. REc. H2012, H2018 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Burton) ("In the last decade child welfare has grown into an enormous bureaucratic
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prompted Congress to reassess its approach to the child welfare
system and served as the main impetus for the enactment of the ASFA
in 1997.112
2. Provisions of ASFA
The philosophical theory regarding how best to achieve
''permanence for children" is probably the most important change
resulting from the passage of the ASFA .13 Rather than emphasizing
the preservation and reunification of families as the AACWA does,' 14
the ASFA pushes states to implement legislation favoring the speedy
termination of parental rights and an expedited adoption process." 5 In
order to receive federal funding, the ASFA requires states to establish
a new time line for filing a petition to terminate parental rights.116 This
new time line is based on a child's length of stay in the foster care
system that is biased toward preserving the family at any cost."); Title IV-E Foster Care
Eligibility Reviews and Child and Family Services State Plan Reviews, 63 Fed. Reg. at
50,061 (noting that confusion and misinterpretation of the reasonable efforts standard
have caused states to return children to natural parents without a regard to child safety);
see also Grimm, supra note 96, at 2 (discussing how both the child welfare field and
Congress have blamed the "reasonable efforts" requirement for urging child welfare
agencies to return children to unsafe homes).
112. See Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility Reviews, 63 Fed. Reg. at 50061 (listing
four reasons for passing AFSA); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 7-9, reprinted in
1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2740-41 (explaining the background and need for the legislation).
113. See Heath Foster, Move Toward Permanent Homes is on a Faster Track, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 18, 1998, at AlO (noting that ASFA marks a major shift in
philosophy and focuses less on the reunification of biological families and more on the
rapid placement of children in a permanent and safe setting even if not with biological
parents).
114. See id. (noting that until last year, the federal law emphasized the significance
of biological families and presumed that even when cases involved abuse, states should
make all efforts to bring families back together). Additionally, during the
congressional debates on ASFA, Congressman Shaw noted the federal law's former
emphasis and stated, "[flederal statutes now put too much emphasis on providing all
kinds of services to rehabilitate troubled families." 143 CONG. REC. H2012, H2015
(daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Shaw).
115. See D.C. Adoption and Foster Care Program Revisions, 1998: Hearings on H.R.
867 Before the D.C. Subcomm., 105th Cong. 10 (1998) (statement of Rep. Dave Camp)
(noting that the goal of AFSA "is to make adoption easier"); H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 7,
reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739 (stating that AFSA will expectedly substantially
increase the number of adoptions in the years ahead); 143 CONG. REC. H2012, H2013
(daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pryce) (noting that one way to ensure that
abused and neglected children have a happy life is to speed up the adoption process).
Despite ASFA's new focus on adoptions, ASFA continues the federal family preservation
and support services program initially enacted in 1980. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 629(a)
(amended 1997) (West Supp. 1998). For an overview and discussion of these
provisions, see Grimm, supra note 96, at 7.
116. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E) (West Supp. 1998) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)
(West 1991)).
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system.1 17 The ASFA provides that a state must file a termination
petition if a child has been in foster care for fifteen out of the most
recent twenty-two months.' 1 8 The ASFA, however, does provide
three exceptions to this mandated provision. 19 First, the State need
not file a termination petition if a relative cares for the child.
12 0
Second, the ASFA suspends the termination requirement if the state
agency has documented a compelling reason explaining why filing is
not in the best interest of the child. 21 Third, the state need not file the
termination requirement if it failed to provide the child's family with
the services necessary to safely reunite the child with his or her
parents.'22
117. See id. Jess McDonald opposed this provision and expressed concern that
requiring states to initiate the termination of parental rights fails to consider cases
where children have strong ties to biological families. See Adoption Hearings,
statement of Jess McDonald, supra note 109, at 4-5. He also explained that this
requirement fails to give states the flexibility to decide in an individualized manner what
is in the best interest of the child. See id. at 5. For a critique of strict timelines for the
initiation of termination of parental rights, see Ayres Hand, supra note 97, at 1267-88.
118. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(e). Congress intensely debated this portion of ASFA
and altered it several times before they finally enacted it. See Grimm, supra note 96, at
4. In an initial stage of the legislation, Congresswoman Kennelly supported a plan that
mandated termination petitions in cases where children were under ten years of age and
had been in the foster care system for 18 months. See id. Congressman Tiahart
supported a mandated termination petition for children who had been in foster care for
twelve months. See id. In response to the Tiahart approach, Congresswomen Kennelly
stated:
Mr. Chairman, I agree with the author of the amendment that the current child
welfare system sometimes errs on the side of the parent without significant
regard for a child's safety. Obviously, that is one of the reasons why the
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Camp] and I did introduce this bill. However, I
feel that the legislation before us makes it clear that a child's safety has to be
the paramount concern, and it requires States to move more quickly in finding
permanent homes for children. But if the current system sometimes
overemphasizes family reunification, the Tiahart amendment would swing, I
feel, the pendulum too far the other way by not giving States enough
opportunity to restore families.
143 CONG. REc. H2012, H2027 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly)
(alteration in original).
119. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii).
120. See id. § 675(5)(E)(i).
121. See id. § 675(5)(E)(ii).
122. See id. § 675(5)(E)(iii). This last requirement will likely have the most impact
because a paucity of timely and appropriate services for parents is a ubiquitous problem
in child welfare. See Grimm, supra note 96, at 4. The problem is most notable in the
area of substance abuse, which is often present in child abuse and neglect cases. See id.
at 4-5; Adoption Promotion Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm.
on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 51 (1997)
(statement of Mary Lee Allen, Director of Child Welfare Division, Children's Defense
Fund) [hereinafter Adoption Hearings, statement of Mary Lee Allen] ("It is the absence
of services that often delays final permanency decisions."); Marsha Garrison, Why
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Further, in an effort to redress the perceived shortcomings of the
former reasonable efforts requirement and to place the health and
safety of the child first, the ASFA adds three new exceptions to the
reasonable efforts requirement.123 The ASFA does not require
reasonable efforts if one of the following exists: (1) the parent has
forced the child to experience one of a number of aggravated
circumstances such as torture, abandonment, or sexual abuse;124 (2)
the parent has killed another one of his or her children or aided,
abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited another to do so;25 or (3)
the state has terminated the parent's rights with respect to a sibling of
the child who is the focus of the proceeding.
26
Additionally, the ASFA sets a new time frame for permanency
hearings of children. 127 Under the ASFA, permanency hearings must
occur within twelve months from the time the child entered foster
care. 28 This is a departure from the eighteen-month time frame that
the AAWCA formerly permitted.129 The ASFA also alters the nature
Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 428 (1983) (arguing that many
agencies do little to help parents regain custody of their children and that caseworkers
give minimal attention to the family problems that necessitate the removal of the
child): Richard Wexler, Saving the Children, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 7, 1998 at
1, available in 1998 WL 5254869 (noting that states have afforded parents "next to
nothing" with respect to services and that states have given parents "cookie cutter"
service plans with no corresponding commitment from the child welfare system to
provide services). For a substantial examination of this problem with respect to
children, see Karoline S. Homer, Program Abuse in Foster Care: A Search for Solutions,
I VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 177, 182-202 (1993).
123. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)-(iii). In 1996, Congress also narrowed the
circumstances in which the reunification requirement applies. See Grimm, supra note
96, at 2 n.9. Specifically, Congress amended the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act to require that by October 3, 1998, each state adopt and implement "provisions,
procedures, and mechanisms" to prohibit states from returning a child to a parent who
has committed one of the several enumerated crimes. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. §
5106(a)(b)(2)(A)(xii)).
124. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i).
125. See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii).
126. See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii).
127. See id. § 675(5)(C).
128. See id.
129. See id. § 675(5)(C) (referring to the federal legislation prior to ASFA). During
her testimony about H.R. 867, Mary Lee Allen, Director of the Child Welfare Division
of the Children's Defense Fund, questioned the impact that this provision would have
and stated:
[iut is important to remember that for 17 years states have had the option to
hold permanency hearings at 12 months (the new time frame for H.R. 867) and
according to the U.S. General Accounting Office, at least 18 states now do so;
some states also require that termination petitions be filed at particular times
if children are still in care, yet there are still almost 100,000 children in care
awaiting permanent families. Services must be added to H.R. 867 along with
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of the determinations made at permanency hearings. 13 0 Rather than the
former practice of the court determining the "future status of the
child,"'31. ASFA requires courts to choose from a list of four options to
determine a "permanency plan" for the child. 132 The options include
returning the child to the parent, placing the child for adoption,
referring the child for legal guardianship, or placing the child in a
different planned permanent living arrangement.
133
The ASFA also attempts to boost adoptions by providing states with
additional financial incentives for placing children into permanent
adoptive homes. 134  Specifically, the ASFA provides states with
$4,000 for each finalized adoption that they achieve and an additional
$2,000 for each special needs adoption that they achieve. 135 Several
other ASFA provisions include 136 expanded rights for foster parents,
preadoptive parents, and relatives;1 37 an assessment of state perform-
ance in protecting children; 138 a study on the coordination of substance
abuse treatment and child protection services; 139 documentation of state
the procedural changes already in the bill in order to benefit children.
Adoption Hearings, statement of Mary Lee Allen, supra note 122, at 57.
130. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C) (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
131. Id. § 675(5)(C) (West 1991).
132. See id. § 675(5)(C) (Supp. 1998).
133. See id. A permanent living arrangement for a child could include living with a
"fit" and "willing" relative. See H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 13 (1997), reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2745.
134. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 673b (West Supp. 1998).
135. See id. § 673b(d)(1).
136. For a summary of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 in its entirety, see
Child Welfare League of America, Summary of The Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 (visited September, 1998) <http://www.cwla.org/cwla/publicpolicy/p1105-89
summary.html>
137. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(G).
138. See id. § 679(b).
139. See id. § 613 note Coordination of Substance Abuse and Child Protection
Services (West Supp. 1998), amended by Child Support Performance and Incentive Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-200, Sec. 410(a), 112 Stat. 645 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 613). The study will address "the extent and scope of the problems of substance abuse
in the child welfare population; the types of services and the outcome of services
delivered to this population; and legislative recommendations to the Committees on
Ways and Means and Finance." H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 18-19 (1997), reprinted in
1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2751. Congress added this provision because of the high
prevalence of substance abuse in child abuse and neglect cases. See id. Specifically,
substance abuse "appears in up to 80% of the substantiated abuse and neglect cases." Id.
Further, child welfare agencies have cited substance abuse, along with abuse and neglect
and economic hardship, as one of the three most common reasons that children enter the
foster care system. See id. One Senate version of the bill would have facilitated a
parent's entry into substance abuse treatment programs as well as emphasized that states
place children and parents together in residential treatment centers. See Grimm, supra
note 96, at 5 n.29. (citing S. 611, 105th Cong. 1997)). Such legislation would obviate
Illinois Adoption Act
efforts to place children in adoptive homes; 4 and criminal recordchecks for prospective foster and adoptive parents.14'
3. Theoretical Basis of ASFA
a. "Psychological Parent" Theory
The concept of "permanency planning for children" has been a
central tenet of child welfare policy over the past thirty years.'42
Policy makers began implementing this concept into child welfare
policy 143 in response to the "psychological parent" theory developed
by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit.'" Under the
"psychological parent" theory, a child's different sense of time and
need for continuity is paramount in any decision. 45 Further, a child's
healthy psychological development is contingent upon a stable and
uninterrupted relationship with one care giver-the "psychological
parent."'' 46 The child's biological parent, however, is not the only
person in a child's life who can fulfill the role of the child's
"psychological parent."'' 47 Rather, a "psychological parent" may be
anyone who, "through interaction, companionship, interplay, and
mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological.., as well as ... physical
the need to separate the child and parent during recovery. See id. Congress, however,
removed the provisions from this bill and replaced them with a "substance abuse study."
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 613n. Coordination of Substance Abuse and Child Protection
Services.
140. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(1)(E).
141. See id. § 671(a)(20)(A)(i)-(ii).
142. See Ayres Hand, supra note 97, at 1256.
143. As mentioned, policymakers first statutorily recognized the concept of
"permanency planning" in 1980 with the passage of the AACWA. See supra text
accompanying notes 98-105 (discussing AACWA's treatment of "permanency
planning"). They further reflected this concept in the provisions of ASFA. See supra
text accompanying notes 113-122, 127-133 (discussing ASFA's treatment of
"permanency planning").
144. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 3 (1973)
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ET AL.]. For a discussion of the impact of Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit, see Garrison, supra note 122, at 446 ("[tihe permanency program owes much of
its design ...to Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit."); see also Ayres
Hand, supra note 97, at 1257 ("[Alt the heart of the permanency planning concept lies
the notion of the 'psychological parent' as developed in the collaborative works of
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit.").
145. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 144, at 31-32 ("[C]ontinuity of relationships,
surroundings, and environmental influence are essential for a child's normal
development"); see also id. at 40 ("A child's sense of time, as an integral part of the
continuity concept, requires independent consideration.").
146. See id. at 19.
147. See id.
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needs." '148 The psychological parent theory further argues that since a
child is intensely sensitive to separations from their "psychological
parent," 149 even a brief disruption to this relationship can profoundly
damage a child. 5 ° Based on these principles, Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit harshly criticized the laws governing foster care.' 51 They
specifically advocated for child welfare policies that would not disrupt
the relationship between a child and his or her "psychological parent"
absent the gravest of circumstances.1 2 In light of this emphasis, it is
not surprising that the psychological parent theory has served as the
primary rationale for terminating the rights of biological parents.'53
b. Criticisms of the "Psychological Parent" Theory
Policymakers have widely accepted the psychological theory since
its inception. 5 4 Despite this acceptance, however, critics have faulted
the psychological parent theory for its unreliable research methods.'55
Specifically, the theory inaccurately assumes that separation and
discontinuity are the major causes of distress and harm to children. 5 6
Further, the psychological parent theory overemphasizes the
"exclusivity" of the parent-child relationship without regard for the
child's ability to maintain multiple attachments. 57 Moreover, critics
argue that the psychological parent theory seriously underestimates the
importance of biological ties and the potential psychological damage
148. Id. at 98.
149. See id. at 11.
150. See id. at 40-42.
151. See id. at 99.
152. See id. (proposing a model child placement statute that would minimize the
disruptions of continuing relationships between a psychological parent and child).
153. See Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of
Parental Rights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 397, 403
(1996); see also Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological
Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 348 (1996) ("As a result of
permanency planning mandates, terminations of parental rights skyrocketed.").
154. See Garrison, supra note 122, at 446-47 ("[E]very subsequent proposal to
reform the child welfare system has drawn its vocabulary and central ideas from this
["psychological parent theory"] framework").
155. See Johnson, supra note 153, at 405-6; see also Garrison, supra note 122, at
457 (stating that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit fail to provide their readers with any
studies, theoretical work, or other evidence that support their proposals).
156. See Johnson, supra note 153, at 406-07.
157. See id. at 407 (noting that the theory does not recognize the "myriad of
caretaking relationships a child may enjoy"); see also Michael S. Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from
Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of
Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 672 (1976) (arguing that child welfare policy
should reflect findings that children benefit from "two sets of parents").
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that may result from cutting a child off from his or her family of
origin.'58 Critics of the psychological parent theory point out that the
biological family is the primary lifeline and source of identity for
children. 1'59 They further argue that even inadequate parents continue
to be significant in a child's development.'6° In light of the significant
role that biological parents play in a child's life, critics have urged a
more balanced approach to child welfare than the psychological parent
theory formerly offered. 61  Specifically, critics have suggested an
approach that places less emphasis on the termination of parental rights
and allows for the maintenance of a child's relationship with both the
"psychological parent" and the biological parents.'62 Critics maintain
that this type of approach would better ensure the healthy development
of children. 163
III. DISCUSSION
In June of 1998, the Illinois General Assembly responded to the
158. See Johnson, supra note 153, at 408; see also Margaret Beyer & Wallace J.
Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: Their Effect on Termination of Parental Rights
and Permanence, 20 FAM. L.Q. 233, 239 (1986) ("The importance of the birth family to
the child has not been sufficiently appreciated in the child welfare system").
Additionally, in his seminal article on termination of parental rights and adoption of
foster children, Robert Borgman, a child psychologist specializing in dependent
children, argued that ongoing contact with a child's birth family benefits children. See
Robert Borgman, Antecedents and Consequences of Parental Rights Termination for
Abused and Neglected Children, LX CHILD WELFARE 391, 402 (1981).
159. See Byer & Mylniec, supra note 158, at 237-38.
160. See id. Beyer and Mylniec argue:
Although only intermittent contact may have occurred, biological parents,
even when inadequate, continue to be significant in a child's development.
The biological family is the source of identity for a child. Children feel part of
the biological family and its roots: they resemble their parents, possess some
personality traits of their parents, and have the family health problems. What
a child knows and imagines about the biological family helps to mold the
child's self-perception. The child's self-respect derives from characteristics
most likeable about the parents.
Id.; see also Fernando Colon, Family Ties and Child Placement, 17 FAMILY PROCESs 289,
289 (1978) (discussing the "primacy of [a] child's experience of biological-familial
continuity in establishing [his or her] sense of self and personal significance").
161. See Johnson, supra note 153, at 409-10; see also Garrison, supra note 122, at
474 (arguing that the child's need for permanence may justify depriving a parent of
custody, but does not always justify completely severing the child-biological parent
relationship through the termination of parental rights).
162. See Johnson, supra note 153, at 409-10; see also Garrison, supra note 122, at
474.
163. See Johnson, supra note 153, at 409-10; see also Garrison, supra note 122, at
474.
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ASFA' 64 by enacting the Senate Bill 1339.165 The Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") was the primary drafter'166
of Senate Bill 1339.167 Further, DCFS incorporated the bill, in part,
into section 2/13 of the Juvenile Court Act ("section 2/13").168 Section
2/13 creates strict time lines for one to initiate proceedings to terminate
164. See S. Res. 3, 92nd Legis. Day 5-6 (Ill. 1998). During the second reading of
Senate Bill 1339, Senator Karpeil stated "[i]t implements-this amendment implements
provisions of the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, which passed the
federal level in November. We have-Illinois has until July of this year to implement
the changes in our laws to bring us into compliance with the new federal law." Id.
165. See Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, 1998 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1575
(West) (to be codified in scattered sections of 20, 210, 225, 325, 410, 705, 740, 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. (West 1998)). Senator Karpiel introduced Senate Bill 1339 on
February 10, 1998. See Synopsis of Senate Bill 1339 (I11. 1998). On May 22, 1998,
the Illinois General Assembly enacted this bill into law with no dissent in the Senate
and with 95 yeas, 11 nays and 12 votes of present. See S. Res. 3, 92nd Legis. Day, 35-
36 (I11. 1998); H.R. C.C.R.I, 130th Legis. Day 70 (I11. 1998).
166. See Review of Senate Bill 1339 (June 11, 1998) (unpublished materials, on file
with the Loyola University Civitas Childlaw Clinic). In addition to DCFS, the Office of
the Governor, the Offices of the Cook County Public Guardian, Public Defender and
State's Attorney, and Child Care Association of Illinois, among others, helped to draft
Senate Bill 1339. See Telephone Interview with Terry Lotsoff, Supervisor of the
Termination Unit, Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County (September 4, 1998)
(stating that he personally drafted parental unfitness grounds (i), (k), and (q) of Senate
Bill 1339) [hereinafter Lotsoff Interview]; Telephone Interview with Ron Mormon,
Executive Director, Child Care Association of Illinois (September 17, 1998) (noting
that Child Care Association and the Cook County Public Defender's office among others
took part in the discussions surrounding the contents of Senate Bill 1339); Letter from
Thomas J. Grippando, Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, to Steven Schnorf,
Office of the Governor (Oct. 24, 1996) (on file with the author) (recommending the use
of California statutory framework, which sets the deadline for parents to correct the
conditions in fifteen months, as a model for Illinois) [hereinafter Grippando Letter].
167. Other provisions of Senate Bill 1339 include, but are not limited to, the
following: changes regarding the availability of family preservation services; the
removal of the requirement that the court make a finding that reasonable efforts are not
appropriate or have been unsuccessful prior to the discontinuation of reasonable efforts
by DCFS; a definition of the circumstances for the secured confinement of children who
are abused, neglected, and dependent; expansion of the rights of prospective adoptive
parents including the right to participate in administrative reviews; the diminishment of
considerations of race and ethnicity in matching a child with adoptive and foster
families; the revision of expedited termination provisions; the addition of new criterion
to the "best interest" of the child definition; the expansion of notice requirements by
requiring notice of allegations of abuse and neglect to both foster parents and relative
care givers; the allowance for the early termination of reasonable efforts to reunify
children and families. See Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, 1998 Ill. Legis
Serv. 1575 (West) (to be codified in scattered sections of 20, 210, 325, 410, 705, 750
ILL COMP. STAT.).
168. See Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, sec. 30, § 405/2-13(4.5)(a),
1998 111. Legis. Serv. 1575, 1597 (West) (to be codified at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-
13 (4.5)(a)).
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parental rights. 6 9 The provisions of section 2/13 generally reflect the
provisions that the federal government has mandated in ASFA on this
issue. 7 ' Unlike section 2/13, which initiates a termination proceeding
based on a child's length of time in foster care by requiring the State's
Attorney to file a termination petition, the Adoption Act actually
defines parental unfitness based on the child's length of time in the
foster care system. 1 ' Senate Bill 1339 also incorporates a new
parental unfitness ground for purposes of terminating parental rights
into the Adoption Act. 7 2 Also, unlike section 2/13, the new parental
unfitness ground in the Adoption Act does not reflect any of the ASFA
mandated provisions for states. 173
169. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 405/2-13(4.5)(a).
170. Compare Act of June 30, 1998 § 405/2-13(4.5)(a) (delineating the various
circumstances under which DCFS must request the State's Attorney to file a termination
petition), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E) (West Supp. 1998) (mandating states to initiate
proceedings to terminate parental rights for certain children in foster care). Both
Section 2/13 and ASFA require the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights if a
child has been in foster care fifteen of the most recent twenty two months. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E); Act of June 30, 1998 § 405/2-13(4.5)(a). Section 2/13, however,
slightly differs from ASFA regarding the initiation of termination proceedings.
Specifically, ASFA requires the filing of a petition for the termination of parental rights
under the following circumstances:
[I]f a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a child to be an abandoned
infant or has made a determination that the parent has committed murder of
another child of the parent, committed voluntary manslaughter of another
child of the parent, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to
commit such a murder or such as voluntary manslaughter, or committed a
felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to
another child of the parent ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E). Unlike the provisions in ASFA, however, section 2/13
triggers the filing of termination petition if the parent has committed, attempted to
commit or solicited the first or second degree murder of any child. See Act of June 30,
1998 § 405/2-13(4.5)(a)(iii). Further, rather than generally referring to felony assault
as a trigger for filing a termination petition as in ASFA, the Illinois statute specifically
lists the crimes of aggravated battery, aggravated battery of a child, felony domestic
battery and aggravated criminal sexual assault. See id.
171. See Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, sec. 40, §50/1(D)(m-1), 1998
Ill. Legis Serv. 1575, 1625 (West) (to be codified 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/l(D)(m-1)).
Specifically, Section 50/1(D)(m-1) provides that a parent is unfit if:
a child has been in foster care for 15 months out of any 22 month period which
begins on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1998 unless the
child's parent can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more
likely than not that it will be in the best interests of the child to be returned to
the parent within 6 months of the date on which a petition for termination of
parental rights is filed under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.
Id.
172. See id.
173. Compare Act of June 30, 1998 § 50/1(D)(m-1) (rendering a parent unfit if a child
has been in foster care 15 out of the most recent 22 months), with 42 U.S.C.A. §
675(5)(E) (requiring the state to initiate termination proceedings if a child has been in
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A. Section 2/13 of the Juvenile Court Act
The Illinois General Assembly, both in compliance with and in
response to the ASFA, incorporated the new legislation into the
Juvenile Court Act under section 2/13.174 Per the ASFA's mandate,
section 2/13 provides that if a child has been in foster care for fifteen
out of the most recent twenty-two months, 175 then DCFS must request
the State's Attorney to file a petition or motion for the termination of
parental rights.176 After filing such a termination petition, the State's
Attorney must then prove that the parent is unfit under one of the
existing parental unfitness grounds in order to terminate parental
rights. 177 Additionally, section 2/13 includes three exceptions to the
requirement that a state file a termination petition if a child has been in
foster care for fifteen out of twenty-two months. 78  First, the State
need not file a termination petition if a relative cares for the child.17 9
Second, Illinois provides an exception to the initiation of termination
proceedings in cases where DCFS has documented a "compelling
reason" why filing such a petition would not be in the best interest
180
of the child. 18 1 Finally, Illinois permits an exception to the fifteen out
foster care for 15 out the most recent 22 months).
174. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 405/2-13(4.5)(a).
175. Section 2-13(4.5)(b) defines the date that a child enters foster care as the earlier
of: "(1)[t]the date of a judicial finding at an adjudicatory hearing that the child is an
abused, neglected, or dependent minor; or (2) 60 days after the date on which the child is
removed from his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian." Id. § 405/2-13(4.5)(b)(l)-
(2).
176. See id. § 405/2-13(4.5)(a)(i). Section 2-13's 15 out of 22 month time frame for
filing a petition to terminate parental rights reflects the federal language in ASFA. See
42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E).
177. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 50/1(D).
178. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 405/2-13(4.5)(a)(i)-(iii); These exceptions are
identical to the ones created in ASFA. See 42 U.S.C.A § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii).
179. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 405/2-13(4.5)(a)(i).
180. Senate Bill 1339 amended the "best interest" criterion to be used in determining
a permanency decision for a child by adding: "[t~he child's need for permanence which
includes the child's need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures
and with siblings and other relatives." See id. § 405/1-3(4.05)(g). Other "best interest"
criterion include:
(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food shelter, health
and clothing; (b) the development of the child's identity; (c) the child's
background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (d) the child's
sense of attachments; (e) the child's wishes and long term goals; (f) the child's
community ties, including church, school, and friends ... ; (g) the uniqueness
of every family and child; (h) the risks attendant to entering and being in
substitute care; (i) and the preferences of the persons available to care for the
child.
Id.
181. See id. § 405/2-13(4.5)(a)(ii).
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of twenty-two months requirement for filing a termination petition if
the court has made a finding within the preceding twelve months that
DCFS has not made reasonable attempts to reunify the child with his
or her family.'82 With the addition of the above provisions to section
2/13 of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, Illinois satisfied ASFA's
federal requirements with respect to the initiation of termination of
parental rights for children who are in the foster care system. 183
B. ASFA's Impact on the Adoption Act
In addition to the new provisions in section 2/13, the Illinois
General Assembly incorporated the fifteen out of twenty-two month
time line into the Adoption Act.' 84 By making this change, the Illinois
General Assembly further emphasized termination of parental rights as
the primary method for achieving permanence for children. 85
Although the ASFA did not require this, the Illinois General Assembly
used the fifteen out of twenty-two month time line as a new ground for
proving parental unfitness. 86 Specifically, under the new ground, a
182. See id. § 405/2-13(4.5)(a)(iii). The Illinois exception regarding reasonable
efforts to reunify the child with his or her family differs slightly from the analogous
exception in ASFA. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E)(iii). Specifically, Illinois requires
that a finding of no reasonable efforts on the part of the state be made "within the
preceding 12 months" whereas ASFA simply provides an exception to the filing of the
petition if "[t]he State has not provided to the family of the child, consistent with the
time period in the State case plan, such services as the State deems necessary for the safe
return of the child to the child's home ..... Id.; see also Act of June 30, 1998 § 405/2-
13(4.5)(a)(iii). Thus, by providing a specific time frame in which a finding of no
reasonable efforts must be made, the Illinois General Assembly narrows this exception.
See id. § 405/2-13(4.5)(a)(iii).
183. Compare Act of June 30, 1998 § 405/2-13(4.5)(a) (instructing DCFS to request
that the State's Attorney initiate termination of parental rights proceedings when
certain circumstances are met), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E) (specifying situations in
which the states must initiate termination of parental rights proceedings for a foster
child).
184. See Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, sec. 40 § 50/l(D)(m-1), 1998
I11. Legis. Serv. 1575, 1626 (West) (to be codified 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(m-l)).
185. During the House debate over the "15 out of 22 months" provisions contained
in Senate Bill 1339, House sponsor of the bill, Representative Thomas Dart stated:
The thought here was, as I say, A, to comply with some of the federal
guidelines that have come down, but, B, to end this unending cycle that we
have right now where we have children that are languishing in foster care
forever and ever and ever and this would be . . . nearly grounds for it, which
would have to be proved up and have to go in front of the court, nonetheless,
to show that this a grounds that they should follow through on.
H.R. 90-CCR.I, 130th Legis. Day 12 (Ill. 1998).
186. Compare Act of June 30, 1998 § 50/l(D)(m-1) (using the 15 out of 22 month
time frame as a parental unfitness ground), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E) (West Supp.
1998) (using the 15 out of 22 month time frame solely as the basis to file a termination
petition). While a total of 11 members of the House of Representatives voted against
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court may find a parent unfit if the child has been in foster care for
fifteen out the most recent twenty-two months.
187
C. Differences Between Section 2/13 and the Illinois Adoption Act
The use of the fifteen out of twenty-two month time line to measure
parental unfitness in the Adoption Act significantly differs from the
Senate Bill 1339 in its entirety, only one member, Representative Davis, actively
challenged the provision that incorporated the fifteen out of twenty two month time line
into the Adoption Act as a means to measure parental unfitness. See H.R. 90-CCR 1,
130th Legis Day 31 (111. 1998). Specifically, Representative Davis argued:
[s]o actually, though, this Bill states, we're talking about dates, the date of
entering foster care is more of a determiner if the parent gets the child back,
[t]han if the child, the parent is ready to receive the child. How many months
are we giving the parent to prepare him or herself to be a parent .... If I didn't
know, if I didn't know better, I would go along with this Bill, Representative
Dart, but I know of cases, I have talked to the Department of Children and
Family Services. I have said to them, 'Mrs. Blank Blank and her mother want
her children. They are capable of caring for their children. They have gone
through 12 months of parenting classes twice. They have been to a
psychiatrist. They've done everything the department has required of them,
and yet, they refuse to give them back their children. This is flawed
legislation.
Id.
187. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 50/1(D)(m-1). In addition to the ground rendering a
parent unfit based in a child's length of stay in foster care, Senate Bill 1339 also added
several other new parental unfitness grounds. These grounds included:
(i) Depravity. Conviction of any one of the following crimes shall create a
presumption that a parent is depraved which can be overcome only by clear
and convincing evidence: (1) first degree murder ... or conviction of second
degree murder.. . of a parent of the child to be adopted; (2) first degree murder
or second degree murder of any child . . . (3) attempt or conspiracy to commit
first degree murder or second degree murder of any child ... (4) solicitation to
commit murder of any child ... ; or (5) aggravated criminal sexual assault ....
(k) Habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs, other than those prescribed by
a physician, for at least one year immediately prior to the commencement of
the unfitness proceeding. There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is
unfit under this subsection with respect to any child to which that parent gives
birth where there is a confirmed test result that at birth the child's blood,
urine, or meconium contained any amount of a controlled substance . . . or
metabolites of such substances . . . and the biological mother of this child is
the biological mother of at least one other child who was adjudicated a
neglected minor under subsection (c) of Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act
of 1987.
(q) The parent has been criminally convicted of aggravated battery, heinous
battery, or attempted murder of any child.
Id. §50/l(D)(i),(k),(q). Terry Lotsoff, Supervisor of Termination Unit in Cook County
Juvenile Court, Office of the State's Attorney in Cook County drafted these grounds. See
Lotsoff Interview, supra note 166. Mr. Lotsoff did not write the 15 out of 22 month
unfitness ground. See id.
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purpose of section 2/13.88 Specifically, section 2/13's sole purpose is
to initiate termination proceedings after a child has been in foster care
for fifteen out of twenty-two months. 89 The initiation of termination
proceedings under section 2/13 does not have an impact on the
separate determination of whether a parent is unfit for purposes of
terminating his or her parental rights.' 90 Indeed upon initiating the
termination proceedings that section 2/13 requires, the state must still
proceed to prove that the parent is unfit under one of the parental
unfitness grounds contained in the Adoption Act. 191 Unlike section
2/13, however, the fifteen out of twenty-two month time line, as used
in the Adoption Act, in and of itself renders a parent unfit.192
188. See Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, sec. 30, § 405/2-13(4.5)(a),
1998 I1. Legis. Serv. 1575, 1597 (West) (to be codified 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-
13(4.5)(a)).
189. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 405/2-13(4.5)(a). It is questionable, however,
whether Representative Thomas Dart, the House sponsor of Senate Bill 1339, was aware
of the important difference between the use of the fifteen out of twenty-two month time
line in section 2-13 as the trigger to file a termination petition and the use of the fifteen
out of twenty-two month time line in the Adoption Act as a grounds for proving parental
unfitness. See H.R. 90-CCR 1, 130th Legis. Day 12 (Ill. 1998). Specifically, when
Representative Dart was asked about the new 15 out of 22 month parental unfitness
ground, he responded "[i]f 15 out of 22 months that the requirement to file a petition is a
federal requirement. A lot of what we are doing are making changes to comply with the
federal law .... Id.
190. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 405/2-13(4.5)(a). Indeed, section 2/13 does not
address parental unfitness and simply states:
With respect to any minors committed to its care pursuant to this Act, the
Department of Children and Family Services shall request the State's Attorney
to file a petition or motion for termination of parental rights and appointment
of guardian of the person with power to consent to adoption of the minor under
Section 2-29 if (i) a minor has been in foster care for 15 months of the most
recent 22 months ....
Id.
191. See id. Indeed, section 2/13 states that a petition for termination may be filed
"under Section 2-29" of the Juvenile Court Act if a minor has been in foster care for
fifteen out of twenty two months. See id. (emphasis added). Section 2-29 states, "[a]
finding of the unfitness of a parent must be made in compliance with the Adoption Act,
without regard to the likelihood that the child will be placed for adoption, and be based
upon clear and convincing evidence." 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-29(4) (West
Supp. 1998), amended by Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act. No. 90-608 sec. 30, § 2-29,
1998 I11. Leg. Serv. 1575, 1625-29 (West).
192. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 50/l(D)(m-1). Section 50/1 states "[t]he grounds of
unfitness are any one or more of the following .... " Id. Section 50/1 lists the new
parental unfitness ground contained in subsection m-1:
Pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, a child has been in foster care for
15 months out of any 22 month period which begins on or after the effective
date of this amendatory Act of 1998 unless the child's parent can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that it will be in
the best interests of the child to be returned to the parent within 6 months of
the date on which a petition for termination of parental rights is filed under the
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Additionally, as part of this new unfitness ground, the Illinois
General Assembly provides a parent with the opportunity to rebut the
presumption of unfitness.'93 Specifically, a parent can show that it
will be in the child's best interest to return to that parent within six
months from the date of the termination petition.1 94  Further, the
Illinois General Assembly provided for the tolling of the statute during
any time period in which the court finds that the state failed to make
reasonable efforts'95 to reunify the child with his or her family.
196
This tolling, however, only applies if it meets one of two
requirements.' 97 First, where the court finds no reasonable efforts
within sixty days of the state's actual failure to make reasonable
efforts.' 98 Second, where the parent filed a motion specifically
requesting a finding of no reasonable efforts within sixty days of the
reasonable efforts failure.199
The Illinois General Assembly fully complied with the requirements
of the ASFA by enacting the provisions of Senate Bill 1339 incorp-
orated into section 2/13.200 The Illinois General Assembly, however,
decided to extend Senate Bill 1339 beyond the requirements of the
AFSA when it implemented those provisions of the bill incorporated
into the parental unfitness grounds of the Adoption Act.20'
Juvenile Court Act of 1987.
Id.
193. The statute requires a parent to make this showing by a preponderance of the
evidence. See id. § 50/1(D)(m-1).
194. See id. This exception was suggested by the Public Guardian's office and was
modeled after the California statutory framework for permanency for children. See
Grippando Letter, supra note 166, at 4. Specifically, in California the court will not
terminate parental rights even if the child has been in the child welfare system for 15
months if the court makes a finding that the child is likely to return home within the
next six months. See CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 366.21(e) (West Supp. 1999).
195. The Illinois General Assembly, however, neither defined nor addressed what
reasonable efforts on the part of the state requires or entails. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 50/1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998), amended by Act of June 30, 1998 sec. 40, § 50/1
1998 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1575, 1625-29 (West)).
196. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 50/1(D)(m-1).
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Compare Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, sec. 30, § 405/2-
13(4.5)(a), 1998 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1575, 1597 (West) (to be codified at 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/2-13 (4.5)(a)) (containing the required federal 15 out of 22 month time frame
for initiation of termination proceedings), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E) (mandating
states to adopt the 15 out of 22 month time frame).
201. Compare Act of June 30, 1998 § 50/1(D)(m-1) (using the 15 out of 22 month
time frame to measure parental unfitness), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 675 (5)(E) (West Supp.
1998) (using the 15 out of 22 month time frame to initiate termination proceedings).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Increase in "Legal Orphans"
The Illinois General Assembly's decision to measure parental
unfitness based on the child's duration in foster care clearly lightens
the state's burden in proving that a parent is unfit.2" 2 The state may
prove a parent is unfit by merely showing that the child has been in
foster care for fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two months.2 °3
Unlike other existing grounds measuring parental unfitness, 2°4 the new
ground does not require the state to present any qualitative data
regarding the parent's capability of or interest in parenting. 25 Given
this lightened burden, it is likely that Illinois more frequently will find
parents unfit thereby resulting in more terminations of parental
rights .26
While the new ground will likely result in an increase in the number
of parental rights terminations, whether it will actually help children
achieve permanency is questionable. 207 Rather, this increase in the
number of parents whose rights are terminated will result in an
increase in "legal orphans"-children legally severed from their natural
parents without an awaiting adoptive home.20 8 Specifically, on any
202. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 50/1 (D)(m-l).
203. See id.
204. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the grounds for parental unfitness in Illinois
existing before the Act of June 30, 1998); note 187 and accompanying text (providing
an overview of the grounds for parental unfitness in Illinois added or amended by the Act
of June 30, 1998).
205. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 50/1 (D)(m-1).
206. Indeed, even before the enactment of this new ground, the termination of
parental rights in Cook County has significantly increased. See supra note 89 and
accompanying text (discussing the rise in the number of termination of parental rights
in Cook County). Specifically, in 1993, the State's Attorney of Cook County filed
1,207 termination petitions, and the court terminated the rights of 958 parents. See
Crum Letter, supra note 89, at 2. By 1997, however, the Cook County filed 5,990
termination petitions and the court terminated the rights of 3,743 parents. See id. As of
February 20, 1998, Cook County Juvenile Court terminated the rights of 4,997 parents.
See id. at 3.
207. See Eileen Finan, Adoption Challenge Mounts, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 1998, § 2, at
3. ("Although the law is a 'positive thing as it looks at time from a children's
perspective,' it also means that an increasing number of children are waiting for
permanent homes"). In a memorandum to Lead Attorneys and Supervisors, Patrick T.
Murphy, Public Guardian of Cook County stated that "[o]ften, an order terminating
parental rights merely creates a statistical illusion of movement and provides no benefit
to the child ...... Memorandum from Patrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian of Cook
County, to Juvenile Court Lead Attorneys and Supervisors 3 (Aug. 17, 1998) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter Murphy Memorandum].
208. See Talk of the Nation, supra note, 89, at 9-10.
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given day in the United States, at least 107,000 of the 507,000
children currently in foster care are legally free and awaiting
adoption.20 9 In Illinois, there are presently 1,300 children awaiting
adoptive homes as a result of parental rights terminations by the
state.2 '0 The numbers for Cook County are even more startling.21 In
just one of the several termination courtrooms in Cook County
Juvenile Court, the state has "legally orphaned" over 600 children,
leaving them with little hope for adoption. 2  Further, in 1997, an
average of 375 children in Cook County awaited adoption at any one
21321time. By August of 1998, this number increased to 449 children.21 4
Factors such as age,215 race,216 and emotional and developmental
problems 217 make it difficult, if not impossible, to find adoptive homes
for some of these "waiting" children.1 8 Despite these astonishing
statistics, Illinois' new parental unfitness ground makes termination of
209. See Amanda Spake, Adoption Gridlock, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 22,
1998, at 31.
210. See Hamburg, supra note 107, § 13, at 1.
211. See Finan, supra note 207, at A.
212. See Murphy Memorandum, supra note 207, at 3.
213. See Finan, supra note 207, at A.
214. See Finan, supra note 207, at A.
215. A child's age has a large impact on his or her likelihood of adoption. See
Spake, supra note 209, at 34. Many adoptive parents fear that older children are
incapable of forming healthy attachments. See id. As a result, infants are four times
more likely to be adopted than older children. See id. Additionally, as documented by
the Child Welfare League of America, 97% of the children awaiting adoption in 1997
were older than one year of age. See MICHAEL R. PETIT & PATRICK A. CURTIS, CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A LOOK AT THE STATES, 1997 CWLA STAT BOOK 117 (1997).
216. Fifty-five percent of all adoptable children in the U.S. are minorities, with
African-Americans comprising four-fifths of this percentage. See Spake, supra note
209, at 32. In Illinois, of the 449 children awaiting adoption as of August 1998, 400
are African-American. See Finan, supra note 207, at A. Many social workers have been
uncomfortable with transracial adoptions and some attribute this discomfort to the
National Association of Social Workers' label of transracial as "genocide." See Spake,
supra note 209, at 34. Presently, only four percent of all adoptions are transracial. See
id.
217. Many parents fear that foster children will have attachment disorders-the
"psychological reaction to past hurt at the hands of a caregiver." Spake, supra note 209,
at 34. Indeed, Alicia Lieberman, Director of the Child Research Project at San Francisco
General Hospital noted that "[a]ttachment disorder has become the boogeyman of
adoption .... " Id.
218. See Malcolm Bush & Harold Goldman, The Psychological Parenting and
Permanency Principles in Child Welfare: A Reappraisal and Critique, 52 AMER. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 223, 229 (1982) (noting that "[tihese are children who, for one
reason or another, cannot or do not . . . wish to be adopted . . . "); see also Borgman,
supra note 158, at 403 ( "In theory, all children may be potentially 'adoptable,' but in
practice the probability is unacceptably low for finding adoptive parents who are
willing and able to cope constructively with children who show grossly unacceptable
behavior.").
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parental rights easier and stubbornly pushes adoption as the necessary
panacea to the failures of the child welfare system.219
Further, the money Congress provided through the ASFA in hopes
of boosting adoptions will not remedy the vast shortage of adoptive
homes needed. 221 Specifically, Congress allocated twenty-million
dollars as a bonus to those states that successfully place children in
adoptive homes.22 1 Critics estimate, however, that this money will
pay for only 4,000 more adoptions nationwide.222 Moreover,
Congress failed to finance more staff to handle the terminations and
adoptions that the federal law mandates. 223  This lack of federal
funding coupled with Illinois' new parental unfitness grounds is likely
to increase the number of "legal orphans" in Illinois.
Finally, by making it easier to find a parent unfit and, consequently,
to terminate parental rights, Illinois also fails to recognize the crucial
role that birth families224 play in a child's developmental and emotional
life. 225 Illinois fails to recognize that many older children may have
formed deep attachments to their birth parents and siblings and,
therefore, may resist adoption altogether. 226 By ignoring a child's
219. See H. R. 90-CCR 1, 130th Legis. Day 32 (Ill. 1998) (remarking that Illinois'
new parental unfitness ground is "moving down the wrong road") (statement of State
Representative Davis). During the debate over Illinois' new parental unfitness ground,
State Representative Davis stated:
Instead of . . .continuing with trying to reunite families, you have taken that
out of the current legislation. You're removing that, the reunification of
families, and you're hastening the time in which you can take somebody's
children and, based upon the number of months they're in foster care, it's
going to be the determiner of if the state now owns this child and there is no
parent anymore. I don't think we have that right ....
Id.
220. See Children in Limbo- A Shameful Slowness in Providing Permanent Homes,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 24, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 5253050.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. It is important to note that when a child becomes "legally free," it is not only
the child's parent or parents that lose the legal right to have contact with the child but
also the child's grandparents and siblings. See Ayres Hand, supra note 97, at 1268 n.97
(citing MARK I. SOLER ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT (MB) No. 16, 74.14[2]
(July 1996)). Cf Borgman, supra note 158, at 397-98 (explaining that "[s]ome
[children] were unwilling to relinquish contact with siblings and other relatives to whom
they were attached when they told, honestly, that the continuation of such relationships
could not be guaranteed").
225. See supra Part II.B.3(b) (discussing the criticisms of the psychological parent
theory).
226. See Robert Borgman, The Consequences of Open and Closed Adoption for Older
Children, LXI CHILD WELFARE 217, 219 (1982) ("Most older children, however, find it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to suddenly erase 10 or more years of
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
biological links in favor of easy terminations, the unfitness ground
leaves Illinois children with the worst of both worlds-the
constructive "death" of their entire biological family and a continuation
of foster care "limbo" with no permanent home.
B. Lack of Adequate Protections for Parents
Illinois' new parental unfitness ground is also flawed because the
protection that it attempts to provide parents is inadequate.227
Particularly, the Illinois General Assembly attempts to provide parents
with protection by allowing the court to toll the time that accumulates
against a biological parent in instances where the state has failed to
make reasonable efforts to reunify a child with his or her biological
22parent. 28 As poor quality and limited availability of services for
biological parents involved in the child welfare system are historical
and ubiquitous problems, this parental protection is extremely
important, if not essential. 2 9 To apply, however, the parent must file
a motion requesting a finding of no reasonable efforts within sixty
days of the time period when reasonable efforts were inadequate.230
This requirement is problematic since it is doubtful that the state will
ever apprise parents of this protection, or at the very least, apprise
them in the time that the statute proscribes.231 A parent cannot rely on
his or her caseworker to notify the parent of this protection since the
relationships, experience, and family history without endangering their basic security
and self identity.").
227. See Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, sec. 40, § 50/1(D)(m-1), 1998
Ill. Legis. Serv. 1575, 1627 (West) (to be codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(m-
1)).
228. See id.
229. See supra note 122 (providing a list of relevant sources). Further, in a statewide
survey on child abuse and neglect proceedings in Illinois conducted between November,
1996 and April, 1997 by the Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of
Chicago, 76% of the respondents identified delays in access to necessary services as
preventing timely permanence for children. See Clark M. Peters & Sheila M. Merry,
Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings in Illinois Jurisdictions Outside Cook County, THE
CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIV. OF CHIC., Dec. 1997, at 25-26. The
Chapin Hall Study reported that the issues raised most frequently by survey respondents
and interviewees concerned the limited service choices available to address the needs of
troubled families. See id. at 26. Respondents were also concerned about the frequent
turnover for caseworkers in both public and private agencies. See id. Respondents also
felt that "there simply aren't enough competent, caring caseworkers available to meet
the substantial needs." Id.
230. See Act of June 30, 1998 § 50/1(D)(m-1); see also supra notes 195-199 and text
(explaining when the statute is tolled).
231. See infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text (discussing the overwhelming
workload of the Cook County Public Defender's Office and how this adversely affects
their clients' cases).
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caseworker is the very person charged with failing to maintain contact
with the parent and to make the requisite reasonable efforts at
reunification.232
Moreover, the parents cannot rely on their attorney either. In at least
half of the jurisdictions in Illinois, Public Defenders represent ninety
percent of parents involved in abuse and neglect proceedings. 233 A
study conducted by the University of Chicago's Chapin Hall for
Children has identified the Public Defender's Office in Cook County,
as being significantly understaffed and critically in need of additional
training to provide better advocacy for their clients. 234 Further, the
study has criticized the overwhelmed Cook County Public Defender's
Office for consistently failing to adequately prepare clients for court
proceedings from the onset and for failing to move cases forward in
the best interests of their clients.235 In light of the high numbers of
children and families involved in abuse and neglect proceedings in
Cook County,236 a high number of parents in Illinois will be unaware
that they have the power to toll the "unfitness clock" that is running
against them. As a result, even if the state cannot attribute a child's
232. In addition, in a 1993 Annual Client Evaluation conducted by the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services, only about one-third of the responding
biological parents had received the "Parent Notice" that explains the state procedures
with respect to temporary custody, guardianship, termination of parental rights and
obtaining information from the Department of Children and Family Services about their
child. See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 1993 FINAL REPORT
ON THE ANNUAL CLIENT EVALUATION 58 (Sept. 1993). Further, according, to DCFS
procedures, a separate handbook containing information about the rights and duties of
parents must be given to parents no later than the initial case review. See id. Just over
30% of responding parents, however, reported that they had received such notice or
handbook. See id.
233. See PETERS & MERRY, supra note 229, at 22.
234. See Sheila M. Merry et al., Discussion Paper, Timeliness and Delay in the Cook
County Juvenile Court Child Protection Division, THE CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN
AT THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO, Nov. 1997, at 29 (noting that court personnel pointed to the
limited number of service appeals filed by Public Defenders as indication of the Public
Defender's failure to advocate for their clients during the post dispositional phase of the
proceedings).
235. See id. Concerns were also raised regarding the poor management practices of
the Public Defender's Office. See id. Unlike other attorney's offices, the Public
Defender's Office does not utilize a "lead attorney" in each courtroom to supervise other
attorneys and to cover cases when necessary. See id. This lack of hierarchy adds to the
inadequate training received by Public Defenders since inexperienced attorneys lack the
guidance and support that a lead attorney would provide. See id.
236. Specifically, in 1997, DCFS indicated 9,686 families for abuse and neglect and
reported 17,871 children as abused and neglected. See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT-FISCAL
YEAR 1997 10 (1997). The DCFS report defines "indicated" as "sufficient and (credible)
evidence has been established to lead a reasonable person to conclude that abuse or
neglect did indeed occur." Id. at 3.
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extended length of time in foster care to a parent's "lack of fitness," the
state may still prove the parent unfit under the new "fifteen out of
twenty-two month" unfitness ground if he or she failed to toll the
statute.13' This shortcoming is simply unacceptable for both parents
and children, and it truly underscores Illinois' failure to recognize the
necessity of biological parents in the lives of children.238
C. Conflicts with the Timeline for Recovering Substance Abusers
By characterizing a parent as unfit based on the "fifteen out of
twenty-two month" timeline, the Illinois legislature fails to consider the
implications for children whose parents are recovering from substance
abuse. 239  For many children both nationwide and in Illinois,
240
parental substance abuse forces them into the child welfare system.24'
Therefore, a myriad of other services, such as drug and alcohol
treatment for the parent, is their path out of the system.242 Unfortun-
ately, drug treatment programs can take a considerable amount of
time. 24' Additionally, it is common for drug addicts to experience
periods of relapse, thereby lengthening the duration of treatment even
further.244 Ascertaining an individual's prognosis for success is
challenging due to the wide range of substances that people abuse, the
varying quality of treatment programs, the severity of addiction, the
addict's readiness for recovery, and the differing definitions of a
successful "recovery. 245 It is certain, however, that the longer an
237. See Act of June 30, 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-608, sec. 40, § 50/1(D)(m-1), 1998
I11. Legis. Serv. 1575, 1627 (West) (to be codified at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/l(D)(m-
I)).
238. See supra Part II.B.3(b) (discussing the criticisms of the psychological parent
theory).
239. See Parental Substance Abuse-Implications for Children, the Child Welfare
System, and Foster Care Outcomes Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) [hereinafter
Ross Hearings] (statement of Jane L. Ross, Director of Income Security Issues Health,
Education, and Human Services Division) (noting that when parental substance abuse is
an issue in a foster care case, it may be difficult to reconcile the goals of making
permanency decisions in shorter time periods and making reasonable efforts to reunite
families).
240. See Jeanne C. Marsh et al., DASAIDCFS Initiative: Evaluation of Integrated
Services for Substance Abusing Clients of the Ill. Public Child Welfare System (prepared
for the I11. Dep't. of Alcohol and Substance Abuse and the I11. Dep't of Children and
Family Services), July, 1998, at I (noting the long standing awareness of caseworkers
in Illinois that a significant portion of their clients are drug dependent).
241. See Ross Hearings, supra note 239, at 1.
242. See id. at 2.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 7.
245. See id. at 8.
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individual remains in treatment, the greater their chances for
improvement and responsible behavior.246 In light of the complex
factors surrounding drug addiction, fifteen months may be insufficient
to determine247 whether a parent is likely to succeed in a drug treatment
program.248 These complex factors and uncertainties also may make it
quite difficult for a recovering parent to prove that he or she will be
ready to care for the child in six months, thereby effectively rebutting
the statute's presumption of unfitness.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Better Social Work Practice and the Use of Other Parental
Unfitness Grounds
Rather than relying on a new parental unfitness ground based on the
number of months a child has been in foster care, Illinois should
instead focus its efforts on improving the quality of social work
practice in the child welfare arena and the level of services that are
available to parents who lose custody of their children because of
abuse and neglect.249 While legislators have criticized child welfare for
placing reunification efforts above child safety, it is questionable
whether appropriate and individualized services have actually been
available to parents in the past.25°
246. See id. at 8-9 ("[E]ven when the parent is engaged in drug treatment, treatment
may last up to I or 2 years, and recovery is often characterized as a lifelong process with
the potential for recurring relapses.").
247. Also, the general lack of quality community-based drug treatment programs
makes it difficult for parents to overcome an addiction in the time frame allotted by the
Illinois legislature. See Wendy Chavkin et al., Drug-Using Families and Child
Protection: Results of a Study and Implications for Change, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 296
(1992) ("A lack of drug treatment programs and other necessary medical care makes it
impossible for many women to obtain the treatment they need and desire."); Dale
Russakoff, 1997 Law Redefines Child-Protection Policies in Place Since 1980, WASH.
POST, Jan. 18, 1998, at A23 (noting that during the ASFA debates, some senators were
concerned that many addicted parents would miss deadlines due to the scarcity of drug
treatment centers programs).
248. See Ross Hearings, supra note 239, at 8 ("[E]xpedited time frames may require
that permanency decisions be made before it is known whether the parent is likely to
succeed in drug treatment." (footnote omitted)).
249. As stated by Catherine Ryan, Chief of the Cook County State's Attorney's
Office Juvenile Justice Bureau: " [Tihe most serious problem is the nature of services that
have or haven't been offered to the parents. We can pass all the laws we want. If we
don't do the social work that's involved, we can't really implement those laws." Louise
Kiernan, Kids Wait Years for Fresh Starts, Terminations-of-Parental-Rights Cases Pile
Up in Illinois, Prolonging Adoption Procedures and Keeping Abused or Neglected
Children in Limbo, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1997, §1, at 1.
250. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text (discussing the impediments
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Further, by seriously committing itself to better social work practice
and social work services, Illinois will make its existing parental
unfitness grounds more meaningful.251 Specifically, the use of ground
(b),25 2 which renders a parent unfit for failing to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare
will become a more effective tool for proving a parent unfit.253
Likewise, ground (M),2 54 which characterizes a parent unfit if that
parent fails to make reasonable efforts for the entire nine-month period
after the child has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent,
under either Section 2-3255 or Section 2-4256 of the Juvenile Court Act
of 1987 will become a better tool for terminating parental rights.257
Since the basis of these two grounds is a qualitative assessment of the
parent's interactions with and attitude regarding the child, as well as
the parent's progress and use of treatment, the state can make a
stronger case to terminate parental rights under these grounds if the
social worker has approached the case with care, competency and
consistency. 258 The state can also make a stronger case under these
created by inadequate availability of drug treatment facilities).
251. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(a)-(t) (West 1993 & West Supp. 1998),
amended by Pub. Act No. 90-608, sec. 40, 1998 III. Legis. Serv. 1575, 1625 (West) and
Pub. Act No. 90-665, sec. 174, 1998 11. Legis. Serv. 1903, 2469 (West).
252. See id. § 50/1(D)(b).
253. See id. § 50/1(D)(b).
254. See id. § 50/l(D)(m).
255. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-3. Section 2-3(1)(a) provides in part that
those who are neglected include:
any minor under 18 years of age who is not receiving the proper or necessary
support, education as required by law, or medical or other remedial care
recognized under State law as necessary for a minor's well-being, or other care
necessary for his or her well-being, including adequate food, clothing and
shelter, or who is abandoned by his or her parents or other person responsible
for the minor's welfare, except that a minor shall not be considered neglected
for the sole reason that the minor's parent or other person responsible for the
minor's welfare has left the minor in the care of an adult relative for any period
of time ....
Id.
256. See id. § 405/2-4. Section 2-4 defines a dependent child as any minor under 18
years of age:
(a) who is without a parent, guardian or legal custodian;
(b) who is without proper care because of the physical or mental disability of
his parent, guardian or custodian; or
(c) who is without proper medical or other remedial care recognized under State
law or other care necessary for his or her well being through no fault, neglect
or lack of concern by his parents, guardian or custodian ....
Id.
257. See id. § 50/l(D)(m).
258. See Borgman, supra note 158, at 392.
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grounds if the services offered to the parent were truly sufficient to
meet that parent's complex and individual needs. 9
B. Consideration of Likelihood of Adoption
In addition to repealing the new ground for measuring parental
unfitness, Illinois should refuse to terminate parental rights when a
child's potential for adoption is limited.260 Weighing this factor is
essential given the fact that terminations occur far more frequently than
adoptions.261 As mentioned, this trend has rendered thousands of
children "legal orphans. 262 In order to avoid this damaging poss-
ibility, Illinois should protect a child's existing parental link despite its
weakness.263 Indeed, many children in foster care maintain a deep
psychological and emotional bond to their biological parents and
families. Thus, terminating rights with no adoptive home in sight is
shortsighted since it may harm a child's identity and esteem while
failing to achieve the goal of permanency. 26 Moreover, this approach
is consistent with many commentators, including social workers,
psychologists, and lawyers who argue against terminations unless "a
high probability for adoption exists. 265
C. Consideration of Child's Age and Bond to Biological Parent
Finally, Illinois should consider a child's age and attachment to a
parent when deciding whether to terminate parental rights and consider
alternatives to terminating parental rights when a strong bond exists.
As discussed, many children continue to remain emotionally attached
to their biological parents after the state has placed them in foster
care.26 6 This is particularly true in cases involving older children who
may have lived with a biological parent for many years. 267 Therefore,
in cases where a bond is particularly strong, possibilities such as long-
259. See id. ("The quality of service[s] surely affects whether a child returns home.").
260. See Ayres Hand, supra note 97, at 1276. By using this approach, fewer children
will become "legal orphans" as a result of a termination proceeding. See id.
261. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the increase in "legal orphans").
262. See supra Part IV.A.
263. See Ayers Hand, supra note 97, at 1276.
264. See supra Part IV.A.
265. Ayres Hand, supra note 97, at 1276; see also Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of
Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster
Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 122 (1995); Borgman,
supra note 158, at 402 (pointing out that one scholar went so far as to propose that no
parental rights termination should become final until the child is legally adopted).
266. See supra Part IV.A.
267. See Borgman, supra note 226, at 219.
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term foster care or placement of the child with a relative of the parent
should be considered since they allow the parent-child relationship to
continue. As a result, these alternatives may provide healthier
outcomes for the family than would termination and complete
severance.2 68 The court should examine these factors during the best
interest phase 269 of the termination proceeding and the Illinois General
Assembly should explicitly list them as best interest criterion. 70
VI. CONCLUSION
Illinois' use of the "fifteen out of twenty-two months" time line as a
ground to measure parental unfitness fails to recognize the significant
role that biological families play in the lives of foster children.
Further, this new ground will fail to move children out of the foster
care system more quickly because adoptive homes are scarce. This
will not help children achieve permanency. Instead, by severing
children's important ties to their biological families with no prospects
for adoption, this new ground will increase the already high number of
Illinois' "legal orphans." This essentially leaves Illinois' children with
the worst of both worlds-no biological parents and continuation in
the foster care system. Use of this new ground will also short-change
parents by failing to adequately protect them from the frequent and
historical failure of the state to make competent and committed efforts
towards family reunification. It further short-changes them by failing
to realistically take into account the complexities of substance abuse
and substance abuse treatment. In light of these shortcomings, Illinois
should abandon this ground and commit itself to better social work
practice and services. Finally, in order to achieve healthier outcomes
for children, Illinois should contemplate a child's likelihood for
adoption as well as a child's age and attachment to a biological parent
before making any decision to terminate parental rights.
CHERYL A. DEMICHELE
268. See Ayers Hand, supra note 97, at 1273.
269. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining that to terminate parental
rights, a court must find that a parent is unfit and that the termination of parental rights
is in the child's "best interest").
270. A child's sense of attachment is already listed as a "best interest" criterion in
Illinois, however, the child's age is not. See supra note 180 (describing the "best
interest" criterion).
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